The photovoltaic industry reshuffle accelerates: from heavy losses and bleeding to clearing, 2025 will be a watershed moment of life or death

In 2024, the photovoltaic industry officially entered the deepest part of its downward cycle. Industry chain prices fell below cash costs, leading companies collectively suffered huge losses, more than 150,000 employees were laid off, large-scale bankruptcies and project suspensions, and a TopCon asset bubble burst...The industry chain from top to bottom entered a brutal "blood war cycle," and the entire industry entered an unprecedentedly cruel reshuffle stage.

This article will analyze the current "systemic pressure" of photovoltaics from nine dimensions and make a phased judgment on the clearing trend in the coming year.
 

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1. Prices below cash cost, market confidence rapidly collapses

Since the third quarter of 2023, the price of silicon materials has dropped to 36 yuan/kg, M10 silicon wafers to 0.98 yuan/piece, battery cells to 0.265 yuan/W, and modules to 0.62 yuan/W. The prices of the entire industry chain are generally below the cash cost line. Most manufacturers can only "use production to cover debts" and reduce cash outflow by taking turns to stop and reduce production.

Although driven by two policy documents, prices rebounded briefly at the beginning of 2024, but after May Day, module prices were readjusted to 0.62–0.68 yuan/W, and face the risk of a further decline in installations and weak demand in the second half of the year. According to institutional calculations, if the module price falls again to 0.5–0.6 yuan/W, it will trigger a wider "clearing squeeze," and most companies will be unable to withstand it.

Reference price for recovery baseline (cash flow break-even point):
Silicon material 55 yuan/kg, M10 silicon wafer 1.55 yuan, TOPCon battery 0.39 yuan/W, module 0.8 yuan/W

2. Top ten photovoltaic leaders' combined losses exceed 53 billion yuan, industry profit bottom line lost

In 2024, among the 138 A-share listed photovoltaic companies, 56 companies reported annual losses, accounting for 40%; among them, 15 companies lost more than 1 billion yuan.

The most concerning is that the combined losses of the top ten companies, including Longi Green Energy, TCL Zhonghuan, JA Solar, Trina Solar, Tongwei, Daquan, etc., exceeded 53 billion yuan, and many of these companies have been unable to achieve break-even for several consecutive quarters.

 

At the same time, 101 companies, accounting for more than 73%, experienced a year-on-year decline in gross profit margin, and 17 companies even had negative gross profit margins, indicating that the industry has entered a state of "overall blood loss".

3. "Optimization" layoffs exceed 150,000 people, structural shrinkage of photovoltaic employment

Since 2024, listed photovoltaic companies have cumulatively "optimized" more than 150,000 employees, of which the top ten companies with the most layoffs, such as Longi, Trina Solar, JA Solar, JinkoSolar, and JA Solar, account for more than 80%.

• The structural contraction of employment reflects companies' attempts to reduce fixed costs to extend their cash flow survival period;
• This trend will further amplify in 2025, and the photovoltaic industry may enter the most serious talent exodus in five years.

4. More than 30 photovoltaic companies went bankrupt, more than 230,000 companies in "abnormal" status

Since 2024, more than 30 well-known photovoltaic companies have announced bankruptcy or liquidation, such as Jiangsu Sunlight, Aikon, Shouhang Hi-Tech, Lingda Shares, Yinxing Energy, and Dongxu Optoelectronics.

Tianyancha data shows that more than 230,000 photovoltaic-related companies have been marked as "abnormal," most of which are small and medium-sized enterprises, including dissolution, cancellation, suspension of business, and revocation. Most companies did not even make a sound before they fell, becoming the silent "sunk cost" in this industry clearing.

5. Net asset value of listed companies exceeds 70% negative, entering "blood loss" state

Statistics show that among the 138 listed photovoltaic companies, more than 70% have negative net assets, and the overall debt scale has exceeded 3 trillion yuan. Companies have transitioned from "cash loss" to "full-cycle blood loss," with liquidity drying up.

Li Zhenguo (Longi Green Energy) once publicly warned:

"The overall industry has not really improved; the so-called 'reversal' is only a temporary repair. Running in this state of blood loss will only accelerate death."

6. Severe overcapacity, three-year inventory cycle under full load of the main industry chain

As of the end of 2024, the capacity of the main industry chain is as follows:

• Silicon material: 1447GW
• Silicon wafer: 1160GW
• Battery: 1193GW
• Module: 1428GW

The actual global annual installed capacity demand is around 450–500GW, and the theoretical digestion cycle has exceeded 3 years. And some regions are still adding duplicate construction under local protection or state-owned enterprise leadership, artificially lengthening the clearing cycle.

7. TopCon asset bubble intensifies, equipment depreciation exceeds 70%, high-leverage companies may "explode"

 

TopCon production lines have rapidly become popular, soaring from a 15% penetration rate at the beginning of 2023 to over 80% in 2024, forming 700GW of effective capacity + 1300GW of capacity under construction in two years. Before the technology is fully stabilized, excessive capital has caused a serious bubble.

In 2023, the procurement price of TopCon equipment was as high as 170 million yuan/GW, while in the second quarter of 2024, the price of similar new equipment was only 80 million yuan, and the price of used equipment was even lower, at 50 million yuan.

Under the leverage structure, the actual investment of some companies is only 30%, and the rest is bank loans or supplier credit. These companies will quickly become insolvent under equipment depreciation and continued losses, and may become the main force of the bankruptcy wave in 2025.

8. Triangular debt surges, small and medium-sized enterprises "bleed"

A large number of accounts receivable and accounts payable have increased in the industry, and leading companies have passed on the risk to downstream companies, causing many small and micro enterprises to fall into a predicament of "hopeless recovery + broken capital chain".

In 2024, the average increase in accounts payable of listed companies was higher than that of accounts receivable, meaning that upstream raw material and auxiliary material suppliers became the "final payers." The further down the industry chain, the lower the risk resistance.

9. Mergers and acquisitions are difficult to implement, state-owned enterprise acquisitions are only "life extension" rather than "clearing"

Although local governments tend to solve problems through mergers and acquisitions by leading companies, most leading companies have clearly stated that they are unwilling to take over debt-ridden capacity:

Longi's chairman, Zhong Baoshen, stated: There are currently no merger and acquisition plans. Most assets are heavily burdened by debt, and there is serious homogenization of production capacity, resulting in value not meeting expectations.

Currently, only some local state-owned asset management platforms (such as Quzhou Industrial Control acquiring Dao De Xin Neng) have become involved; more mergers and acquisitions have not been substantially implemented. Large-scale market-oriented mergers and reorganizations in 2025 are not realistically possible, and industry consolidation will continue to be difficult to advance.

Summary: The reshuffle is not yet over; 2025 will be a decisive year of clearing out.

The photovoltaic industry is currently in a transition period from being "technology-driven" to "cash flow survival":

• Technological Route: The TopCon bubble has burst; HJT/Perovskite technologies are not yet mature.
• Investment Logic: From "capable of doing" to "capable of earning"
• Industry Structure: From expansion competition to survival elimination.

2025 will be a key year for the concentrated clearing and structural restructuring of the photovoltaic industry. Under the intertwined pressures of falling prices, slowing demand, tightening financing, and high leverage risks, only companies with cash flow capabilities, technological moats, and cost control capabilities will truly survive.

For small and medium-sized enterprises, rational withdrawal may be the last safety net; for leading players, managing leverage, choosing the right technological direction, and extending the cash flow cycle are crucial survival tests that must be passed.