Trump's remark leads to a 360% tariff, how long can Chinese photovoltaic companies hold on?

 

I | A 360% hammer falls, the 'export battle royale' in Southeast Asia has begun

This blow came unexpectedly, yet it was also expected.

In March 2025, the US Department of Commerce announced the imposition of high anti-subsidy and anti-dumping duties on Chinese photovoltaic companies with factories in Vietnam, with a combined tax rate of 363.84% ，JinkoSolar, JA Solar, and Trina Solar, the "three giants" of photovoltaics, were the first to be affected, with tax rates reaching 81.03% 、 164.41% 、 152.58% 。

The news caused widespread mourning in the photovoltaic industry, and the A-share photovoltaic index plunged more than 11% on the day.

Earlier, during Trump's first month back in office, he launched three consecutive attacks:

• • The first attack ：Imposing a 10% tariff on Chinese photovoltaic modules, batteries, and silicon wafers;
• • The second attack ：Reactivating Section 301, adding to the tariffs from the Biden era, raising the combined tariff on Chinese photovoltaics to the US to 60% 上下 ；
• • The third attack ：打击“越南代工”转口路径，直接把绕关税的通道堵死。

This is not a tax, it's an industry-level hammer ，a blow that doesn't ask about life or death.

II | Under the tariff 'blockade', who will be the first to die?

These companies exporting from Vietnam have had a good few years. Relying on the 'grey transit' of zero tariffs, they achieved a false prosperity in their business with the US.

Now that the bubble has burst, the Southeast Asian layout is starting to backfire.

According to incomplete statistics, China's photovoltaic component production capacity in Vietnam exceeds 20GW ，accounting for 70% 以上 。

JA Solar, JinkoSolar, and Trina Solar – the three major factories have all been hit. With a 360% tariff, even with the lowest cost and highest efficiency, there are only two words left: “Loss-making” 。

Not to mention those small and medium-sized factories without overseas production capacity, relying on re-exporting and OEMs to make a living, they are directly "flashing and restarting", unable to even catch their breath.

III | Don't rush to say 'the US is dispensable', it's blocking China's profit line overseas

Many people say: "China's photovoltaic exports to the US account for less than 1%, it doesn't have much impact." But this statement is only half true.

Indeed, in 2023, China's direct exports of components to the US accounted for only 0.08% ，and batteries only 0.51% 。But the problem is that this ignores a key fact:

A large number of Chinese photovoltaic products are exported to the US through "transit countries".

Vietnam, Malaysia, and Thailand were once "tax havens" for Chinese photovoltaics. More than 70% of the imported components in the US market come from these countries, most of which are "foreign factories" of Chinese companies.

The United States remains the world's second-largest photovoltaic demand market （about 50 GW/year）, second only to China's domestic market. Moreover, this market's average unit price is higher and the profit margin is better ，it is the core position for many leading companies to "replenish cash flow".

Now, the Vietnam channel has been cut off, meaning that a highly profitable market is being forcibly removed from the shelves.

So don't rush to say that "the impact is not great," this is not a question of serious injury, but cutting off an important lifeline of China's photovoltaic "brand globalization + cash replenishment".

IV | Vietnam is finished, who is the next 'immortal passage'?

Now that Vietnam is out, the "export lifeline" map needs to be redrawn:

Path	Advantages	Problems
Mexico	Enjoys NAFTA, with built-in duty-free channels	Poor supporting facilities, long production line cycle
Saudi Arabia / UAE	Cheap energy, favorable policies	High labor costs, small market
India / Turkey	Cheap, has industrial base	Unstable policies, high risk

 

The point is: Are you going there to survive, or just to "change your shell and continue to roll"?

V | Who is truly transforming, and who is just acting?

This 360% tariff has scared the wits out of those companies that "only know how to export," and it has also pushed those companies that have "already made arrangements" into the spotlight.

✅ Longi: Ohio is already in mass production, completely localized

✅ JinkoSolar: Saudi Arabia builds an integrated chain, taking the initiative

✅ JA Solar: Texas factory ships steadily, bypassing tax traps

These actions are not "responses," but "replacements"; not "cost reductions," but "raising the bar."

Those factories that rely on OEMs in Vietnam and order washing in Southeast Asia will be exposed like deflating balloons once tax rates increase.

This is not the globalization of photovoltaic enterprises, but " "Chinese manufacturing changing shells and selling globally" 。

VI | Who fears tariffs the most? Who has more opportunities instead?

Tariffs are not a death knell; they are an industrial cleansing agent.

Who fears them the most?

• • Second and third-tier component manufacturers who lack overseas production lines and sales networks, relying on OEMs for volume.
• • Pure export manufacturers with razor-thin profit margins, unable to transfer prices.

Who might become stronger instead?

• • Leading companies with local manufacturing, customer relationships, and financing capabilities.
• • Comprehensive manufacturers capable of technological iteration, product upgrades, and brand output.

The lifeline lies not in tax rates, but in structure.

VII | Tariffs are not the end, but the beginning of a breakthrough

This round of tariffs is a "globalization upgrade exam."

Those who fail to score 60 points will be automatically eliminated;
those who score 120 points will get tickets for the next cycle.

The real question is not "how much longer can we hold on," but:

"As China's photovoltaic industry transitions from the world's factory to a global operator, are Chinese companies ready?"