Why is the U.S. energy transition half-hearted?

The United States is both a major global producer and consumer of energy, wielding significant influence over global climate governance and the energy transition. Its energy supply and demand are generally well balanced, and it does not rely on exporting fossil fuels to sustain its economy. However, U.S. President Donald Trump’s deep‑seated hostility toward non‑fossil energy sources such as wind and solar power far surpasses that of leaders in other major net exporters of fossil fuels. Why is this the case?

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The U.S. government is in

Actions in the energy transition

The development of solar, wind, and electric vehicles stands as a key hallmark of the global energy transition toward low carbon. In these sectors, the United States has increasingly fallen behind. For instance, in 1997, U.S. solar and wind power generation accounted for 69% and 54%, respectively, of the global total; by 2024, these shares had declined to 15% and 18%. Similarly, the U.S. once reigned as an “electric‑vehicle superpower,” with its sales representing 44% of the global market in 2013. Yet in recent years, its progress has lagged. In 2024, U.S. electric‑vehicle sales totaled roughly 1.6 million units, accounting for less than 10% of the global share.

There are many reasons why the United States lags behind in its energy transition, and inadequate policy is one of them.

Trump has inflicted profound damage on the United States’ transition to a low‑carbon energy system. During his first term, he withdrew the U.S. from the Paris Agreement; overturned President Obama’s Clean Power Plan (CPP), replacing it with the Affordable Clean Energy (ACE) rule to prop up the American coal industry; and rescinded the Obama administration’s standards for improving vehicle fuel efficiency. After returning to the White House, Trump once again announced the U.S. withdrawal from the Paris Agreement and signaled his intention to roll back the Biden administration’s fuel‑efficiency regulations.

Biden has done little to advance the United States’ low-carbon energy transition. For a variety of reasons, he has imposed numerous constraints on the transition, thereby slowing its progress to some extent.

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U.S. Energy Transition Policy

Why isn’t it working?

When it comes to the U.S. government’s reluctance to pursue a low-carbon energy transition, people often attribute this stance to President Trump.

Trump is a quintessential climate skeptic. In his view, “climate change is the greatest hoax ever perpetrated on the world.” He maintains that conventional energy is both inexpensive and reliable, whereas new energy sources are costly and ineffective, and that fossil fuels are superior to non‑fossil alternatives—this, he insists, is “common sense.”

As president, the personal influence of Donald Trump on U.S. energy‑transition policy certainly should not be underestimated. However, the “Trump factor” is far from the sole determinant of the U.S. government’s energy and climate policies. Even in the absence of a Trump administration, U.S. climate and energy policies have remained relatively cautious. In fact, the United States’ tepid approach to climate and energy issues stems from complex political and social dynamics.

First, the U.S. government has been slow to advance a low‑carbon energy transition, partly owing to deeply entrenched concerns about energy security. Historically, the United States has faced severe energy insecurity. In October 1973, the Fourth Arab–Israeli War erupted. In support of Egypt and Syria, Saudi Arabia and other Arab oil‑exporting countries launched an “oil war” against Western nations that backed Israel. This triggered economic and social turmoil in the United States and left both the government and the public with a strong, enduring sense of energy insecurity—particularly regarding oil. On November 7, 1973, President Nixon addressed the nation via radio and television, for the first time articulating the vision of energy independence. Over the following decades, the U.S. government remained steadfastly committed to this goal. At the beginning of the 21st century, after years of酝酿, the U.S. shale revolution finally took off. U.S. oil production subsequently expanded rapidly and steadily, culminating in 2020 when the country became a net exporter of oil. In material terms, this marked an end to more than four decades of energy insecurity. Nevertheless, the underlying anxieties about energy security among the U.S. government and the public have not entirely dissipated.

Although wind and solar power are clean and low-carbon, they suffer from significant randomness, volatility, and intermittency, making them insufficiently reliable to date. Likewise, electric vehicles still fall markedly short of gasoline-powered cars in terms of driving range, and their reliability remains inadequate. Such objective realities represent common challenges confronting countries worldwide as they pursue a low‑carbon energy transition.

Meanwhile, the United States faces unique security concerns in its energy transition. Producing new‑energy products such as electric vehicles, wind turbines, and photovoltaic panels requires substantial quantities of minerals like lithium, cobalt, and rare earth elements—resources in which the U.S. holds no significant advantage in terms of reserves, extraction, or processing. Former U.S. Senator Joe Manchin, a Democrat from West Virginia, has stated that he does not want Americans to once again have to line up to buy car batteries from other countries, much as they did in the 1970s when they queued for gasoline derived from Middle Eastern oil. This sentiment underscores the security anxieties felt by some Americans amid the broader energy transition. By contrast, the U.S. boasts abundant fossil‑fuel resources and highly developed extraction technologies. Although fossil fuels are non‑renewable and, in theory, their depletion accelerates with increased extraction, the U.S. government maintains that, thanks to its favorable domestic resource endowments and world‑leading extraction capabilities, persisting on a high‑carbon development path would better safeguard national energy security.

Secondly, the U.S. government worries that investing in a low‑carbon energy transition could undermine its competitive edge, particularly vis‑à‑vis China. The fossil‑fuel sector is fundamentally extractive, whereas the low‑carbon energy sector is rooted in manufacturing. Both the Democratic and Republican parties recognize that, aside from extraction, the United States enjoys certain advantages in traditional manufacturing—for instance, it holds specific strengths in internal‑combustion‑engine vehicle production compared with China. However, in the production of clean‑energy technologies—such as wind turbines, photovoltaic systems, electric vehicles, and electrolyzers—the U.S. lacks clear advantages in technology, experience, or equipment, while facing pronounced disadvantages in cost and other factors.

Precisely because of its ambivalence toward manufacturing, even “climate president” Joe Biden has adopted a cautious approach to advancing the low‑carbon energy transition. While promoting clean energy, Biden has emphasized “Made in America,” yet the higher production costs associated with U.S.-made goods have made these clean‑energy products less competitive, thereby hindering progress in U.S. climate governance and the energy transition. For example, in August 2022, President Biden signed the Inflation Reduction Act, which includes measures—such as tax credits—to support the development of electric vehicles in the United States. At the same time, however, the law stipulates that only EVs assembled in North America are eligible for these tax incentives and imposes requirements on the origin of battery components. In September 2024, the Biden administration further imposed a 100% tariff on Chinese‑made electric vehicles. These “small yard, high fence” policies have driven up domestic EV production costs, rendering EV manufacturing and sales unprofitable for U.S. automakers, while the higher prices of these vehicles have deterred potential buyers. As a result, the development of electric vehicles in the United States has lagged during the Biden administration.

Accordingly, if the United States persists in pursuing a high‑carbon energy development path, it will continue to hold the strategic high ground and maintain strategic initiative relative to countries such as China, thereby helping to preserve its status as the world’s sole superpower. Conversely, if it engages in the low‑carbon energy transition, the U.S. would risk undermining its own capabilities and could find itself at a disadvantage in great‑power competition with China and other major powers.

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With regard to U.S. energy transition policies,

How is China responding?

The U.S. government—whether Democratic or Republican—will inevitably adopt a relatively cautious stance on the low-carbon energy transition, driven by national security concerns and other considerations. The Chinese government and enterprises must be fully aware of this reality and take appropriate measures to address it.

On the one hand, it is necessary to accurately assess the prospects for cooperation with the United States on low‑carbon energy transitions. The Chinese government and businesses are already well aware of the conservative nature of the Republican administration—such as the Trump administration—with respect to climate and energy policy, and have accordingly tempered their expectations for effective collaboration under such a regime. However, we may harbor unrealistic expectations regarding the policies of future Democratic administrations in the United States, as well as the prospects for climate and energy cooperation with the Democratic Party. As noted above, even if the Democrats’ rhetoric is appealing, their actual climate and energy policies will inevitably be equally conservative. In engaging in cooperation with the United States—including partnering with deeply blue U.S. states like California—Chinese governments and enterprises should remain level‑headed, appropriately lower their expectations, and uphold the principle of cooperating while competing, and competing while cooperating.

On the other hand, the Chinese government and enterprises should maintain an optimistic outlook on the prospects of global climate governance and the energy transition, and accordingly expand their strategic positioning. Although the United States is among the world’s most advanced nations, it does not represent the prevailing global trend in climate and energy matters. Moreover, whether China persists in making sustained efforts to advance climate governance and a low‑carbon energy transition will have profound implications for the country’s national destiny. The Chinese government and businesses must remain firmly on the right side of history, continue to engage actively in global climate governance and the low‑carbon energy transition, and, throughout this ongoing process, steadily enhance their own competitive edge.